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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mr. Hanson appeals from the district court’s reentered judgment of conviction for
unlawful possession of a firearm.1 The  single  issue  raised  on  appeal  was  whether  the  district
court erred by denying Mr. Hanson’s motion to suppress. This Reply Brief responds to three
arguments put forth by the State:  that voluntariness of consent is purely and always a question of
fact, that the record is incomplete for review of this factual finding, and that the reasonable
person standard is inapplicable.
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of facts and course of proceedings were articulated in Mr. Hanson’s
Appellant’s Brief. (App. Br., pp.1–5.) They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by
reference.
1 Mr.  Hanson  does  not  dispute  the  State’s  assertion  that  the  misdemeanor  convictions  are  not
before this Court on appeal. (Respt. Br., p.4 n.1.)
2ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hanson’s motion to suppress?
3ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Hanson’s Motion To Suppress
On appeal, Mr. Hansen challenged the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence obtained from the warrantless search of his vehicle. (App. Br., pp.12–19.) Mr. Hanson
argued he did not voluntarily consent to the search because, three minutes before asking for
consent, Officer Smith told Mr. Hanson that he was “gonna go look” under the driver’s seat
anyways. (App. Br., pp.8–13.) Mr. Hanson then turned to why Officer Smith’s statement was
improper—Officer Smith did not have probable cause or a warrant to search the car and Officer
Smith could not lawfully look under the seat without either justification. (App. Br., pp.13–17.)
Thus, Mr. Hanson contended Officer Smith made a false and erroneous statement that implicitly
coerced his consent. Finally, Mr. Hanson argued a reasonable person would understand Officer
Smith’s “gonna go look” statement as expressing an intention to search the vehicle. (App. Br.,
pp.18–19.)
The State does not challenge Mr. Hanson’s argument that Officer Smith lacked probable
cause to the search the vehicle. Nor does the State challenge Mr. Hanson’s argument that Officer
Smith could not lawfully look under the seat without probable cause or warrant. Moreover, the
State does not challenge Mr. Hanson’s legal position that consent is invalidated by an officer’s
false, erroneous, or baseless claim on his authority to search. Rather, the State rests its argument
on the premise that voluntariness of consent is a question of fact and, as a factual question,
Mr. Hanson either waived any assignment of error or failed to present a complete record for
review. Mr. Hanson submits that the State’s premise is misguided because it misunderstands the
issue raised on appeal.
4Although voluntariness is generally referred to as a question of fact, certain facts can, as a
matter of law, render consent involuntary. One such fact is a police officer’s false or erroneous
claim of lawful authority to search. This principle is well established by the United States
Supreme Court’s and this Court’s precedent. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 233
(1973) (“[I]f under all the circumstances it has appeared that the consent was not given
voluntarily—that it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of
lawful authority—then we have found the consent invalid and the search unreasonable.”
(emphasis added)); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548–50 (1968) (footnotes omitted)
(“The issue thus presented is whether a search can be justified as lawful on the basis of consent
when that ‘consent’ has been given only after the official conducting the search has asserted that
he possesses a warrant. We hold that there can be no consent under such circumstances. . . . A
search conducted in reliance upon a warrant cannot later be justified on the basis of consent if it
turns  out  that  the  warrant  was  invalid.  .  .  .When a  law enforcement  officer  claims  authority  to
search a home under a warrant, he announces in effect that the occupant has no right to resist the
search. The situation is instinct with coercion—albeit colorably lawful coercion. Where there is
coercion there cannot be consent.” (emphasis added)); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13
(1948) (“Entry to defendant’s living quarters, which was the beginning of the search, was
demanded  under  color  of  office. It was granted in submission to authority rather than as an
understanding and intentional waiver of a constitutional right.” (emphasis added)); Amos v.
United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921) (“The contention that the constitutional rights of
defendant were waived when his wife admitted to his home the government officers, who came,
without warrant, demanding admission to make search of it under government authority, cannot
be entertained.”); State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 489 (2007) (citing cases) (“[A] false or
5erroneous  representation  by  police  regarding  the  right  to  obtain  a  warrant  weighs  against  a
finding of voluntariness.”); State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112, 118–19 (Ct. App. 2007) (citations
and quotation marks omitted) (“A consent is not rendered invalid merely because an officer has
said that a warrant will  be sought if  consent is  refused,  .  .  . but a false representation that the
officer possesses a warrant amounts to coercion. The State’s burden to show that consent was
freely and voluntarily given cannot be met by showing no more than acquiescence to a claim of
lawful  authority.  .  .  .  An  officer’s  false,  erroneous  or  baseless  representation  of  the  ability  to
obtain a warrant weighs against a finding of voluntariness.” (emphasis added)). As shown by this
case law, if a police officer makes these false representations, that fact overpowers any other
factor and tips the scale to a finding of coerced consent. In short, certain facts are conclusive of
coercion.
Here, Mr. Hanson does not argue the district court got the facts wrong or weighed them
incorrectly. Rather, he argues, respectfully, that the district court got the law wrong: Officer
Smith could not “peek in” or “peer in” Mr. Hanson’s vehicle to see what was under the driver’s
seat. As a matter of law, the Fourth Amendment prohibits even minimal intrusions into the
private air space of a vehicle (absent a warrant or probable cause, which the State does not
dispute Officer Smith lacked here). (See App. Br., pp.14–17.) As such, the foundation of the
district court’s ruling—that Officer Smith did not make a false and erroneous statement when he
said he was “gonna go look” anyways—was legally flawed. Officer Smith had no lawful
authority to look under driver’s seat. Because Officer Smith made a false and erroneous
6statement of his legal authority to search, Mr. Hanson’s subsequent consent was coerced and
therefore involuntary.2
Thus, Mr. Hanson did not waive the very issue he raised on appeal by failing to argue
“clear  error.”  Mr.  Hanson  never  argued  “clear  error”  in  the  first  place.  He  argued  the  district
court erred because, as a matter of law, there can be no consent if it is in submission to a claim of
lawful authority. Accordingly, this Court has an adequate record to review this issue. (See App.
Br., pp.19–22.) Again, Mr. Hanson does not take issue with the district court’s factual findings.
There is no dispute on the content of Officer Smith’s statement. There is no dispute on
Mr. Hanson’s subsequent consent. There is no dispute as to any of the facts throughout the traffic
stop. Mr. Hanson’s argument rests entirely on this one factor that Officer Smith made a false and
erroneous  statement  prior  to  Mr.  Hanson’s  consent.  The  video  of  the  traffic  stop  is  not  only
irrelevant to the issue on appeal, but also inaudible and unhelpful, as specifically found by the
district court. Therefore, the video of the traffic stop is not germane to this Court’s review of this
issue. See State v. Easley, 156 Idaho 214, 220 (2014) (portions of the record are not germane
simply because they are part of the whole proceeding this Court will review for the assignment
of error, and missing portions of the record are not presumed to support the district court’s
decision if not germane to the appeal).
Finally, Mr. Hanson appreciates the State’s argument that a reasonable person standard
for the scope of consent does not necessarily comport with the totality of the circumstances
standard for the voluntariness of consent. (Resp. Br., p.9 n.2.) This distinction is well taken. That
being said, Mr. Hanson maintains a reasonable person, be it in Mr. Hanson’s or Officer Smith’s
2 The State puts forth no argument on the merits of Mr. Hanson’s assignment of error. In other
words, the State does not dispute that, if Officer Smith made a false and erroneous statement on
his authority to search, Mr. Hanson’s consent was the product of coercion.
7position, would not have understood by the exchange that Mr. Hanson voluntarily consented to
the search. A submission to colorable police authority is not voluntarily consent. Moreover,
Mr. Hanson submits the reasonableness standard for the scope of consent further demonstrates
what a police officer means he says, “What’s under the seat, you might as well tell me, I’m
gonna go look.” When a “reasonable and prudent officer” asks to “look through” a vehicle, he
intends to search the entire passenger area. See State v. Silva, 134 Idaho 848, 853 (Ct. App.
2000) (request to “look through” a truck equals a request to search). Therefore, even if Officer
Smith  subjectively  meant  only  to  look  at  what  was  in  plain  view  through  the  window  or
threshold of Mr. Hanson’s car, Officer Smith objectively stated an intention to search under the
seat. That is the only reasonable interpretation of Officer Smith’s statement. Consequently, the
district court erred by focusing on what Officer Smith might have meant by his statement. (See
Tr. Vol. II, p.26, L.19–p.28, L.7,  p.28, L.16–p.29, L.8.) On its face, it was a claim of lawful
authority to search, which Officer Smith did not possess. Mr. Hanson’s subsequent consent was
in submission or acquiescence to his claim, rather than an intentional waiver of his Fourth
Amendment rights.
8CONCLUSION
Mr. Hanson respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order denying
his motion to suppress, vacate his judgment of conviction, and remand this case for further
proceedings. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
order denying his motion to suppress and his judgment of conviction and remand this case for a
new suppression motion hearing.
DATED this 23rd day of August, 2017.
__________/s/_______________
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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